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SUMMARY
Across the United States, water quality trading is being explored as a  
mechanism for reducing the costs of cleaning up impaired waterbodies.  
Trading between point sources, such as wastewater treatment plants, and 
nonpoint sources, such as agriculture, can cut costs for regulated entities 
needing to reduce pollutants, and generate revenue for agricultural producers 
who generate credits. However, water quality trading, particularly between  
point and nonpoint sources, can face inherent uncertainties around 
quantification of nonpoint source reductions, participant behavior, regulations, 
and market supply and demand. Effectively addressing uncertainties is crucial 
to ensuring the success of these markets and improving water quality. This 
paper establishes a framework from which to engage federal and state agencies, 
program developers, and stakeholders in a dialogue about these uncertainties 
and appropriate mechanisms for addressing them. 
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to quantify. In addition to uncer-
tainty related to nonpoint source 
credit estimation, water quality  
trading markets may also face  
uncertainty related to participant 
behavior, regulations, and market 
supply and demand. Adequately 
addressing the risks of uncertainty 
can mean the difference between a 
vibrant water quality trading market  
that capitalizes on the most cost-
effective pollutant mitigation mea-
sures and a stagnant, or nonexistent, 
market in which permitted entities 
must either invest in expensive 
technological upgrades or fail to 
meet permit limits and accommodate 
growing populations.
As water quality markets have  
developed, programs have put  
in place unique approaches to 
addressing uncertainties and risks 
associated with market uncertain-
ties. The purpose of this paper is to 
establish a framework identifying 
the uncertainties and risks that are 
common in water quality trading 
programs, as well as some common 
mechanisms for addressing them. 
We hope it will serve as a foundation 
from which to engage federal and 
state agencies, program developers, 
and stakeholders in a national dia-
logue about guidelines for addressing 
uncertainty and risk in water quality 
markets. The types of uncertainty 
discussed in this report include:
  BIophYSIcAl And ScIentIfIc 
UnceRtAIntY. Biophysical and 
scientific uncertainty refers to 
uncertainty regarding how land-
based activities implemented 
to generate credits—especially 
agricultural best management 
practices (BMPs) such as forest 
buffers or cover crops—perform 
given the natural variations  
in weather and site-specific 
conditions, as well as uncertainty 
about our ability to predict  
and estimate the performance  
of these activities. 
  extReMe event UnceRtAIntY.  
Extreme or stochastic events, 
such as fires, floods, droughts, 
disease, and earthquakes, can 
lead to failure of nonpoint source 
control measures that were 
implemented to generate credits. 
Whereas biophysical uncertainty 
includes natural variations in 
weather due to seasonal changes 
and historical weather patterns,  
execUtIve SUMMARY
With the emergence and growing 
maturity of water quality markets 
as a compliance tool for regulated 
sources of pollution, it is increas-
ingly important to ensure that these 
programs are designed to protect 
water quality as well as to create 
efficient and credible markets for the 
participants. However, water quality 
markets, especially those that include 
nonpoint sources, have inherent 
uncertainties that actual environ-
mental benefits will be achieved. In 
the case of reductions from nonpoint 
sources such as agriculture, uncer-
tainties are common because pollu-
tion is diffuse and therefore difficult 
Adequately addressing the risks of 
uncertainty can mean the difference 
between a vibrant water quality trading 
market and a stagnant, or nonexistent, 
market in which permitted entities must 
either invest in expensive technological 
upgrades or fail to meet permit limits 
and accommodate growing populations.
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extreme event uncertainty cap-
tures those variations that are 
largely unpredictable.
  BehAvIoRAl UnceRtAIntY. Behav-
ioral uncertainty is associated 
with whether the credit seller 
will abide by the agreement and 
implement the BMP as planned. 
Uncertainties can arise because of 
the possibility of farmers breach-
ing their contracts, either because 
they did not implement practices, 
adequately maintain practices, or 
otherwise unintentionally de-
faulted on the trade agreement. 
Because regulated point sources 
retain legal liability for meeting 
their permit, they may find it too 
risky to enter into an agreement 
in which there is uncertainty 
regarding the seller’s actions and 
the credits actually generated.
  RegUlAtoRY UnceRtAIntY. 
Regulatory uncertainty largely 
concerns wariness about par-
ticipating in the trading market 
because of the potential for poli-
cies to change in the future that 
could affect credit generation and 
sales. The agricultural commu-
nity may face uncertainty about 
the possible impact of changes in 
agricultural regulations or market 
policies, or they may face uncer-
tainty about how precompliance 
actions will be treated if future 
regulations are imminent. Risks 
of litigation over concerns with 
water quality trading can create 
reluctance for both buyers and 
sellers. Likewise, litigation risks 
could prevent state agencies  
from certifying credits or  
approving trades. 
  MARket UnceRtAIntY. Market 
uncertainty arises from the am-
biguity about supply and demand 
within water quality markets. 
Particularly in the early stages of 
a market, potential sellers may 
be reluctant to enter the market-
place if there is uncertainty about 
demand for their credits. When 
markets are thin and credit prices 
unknown, uncertainty about 
credit prices leads to uncertainty 
for producers about profitability 
entering the market. Likewise, 
buyers who need to purchase 
credits to meet permit limits or 
offset growth may find it risky to 
rely on future credits whose avail-
ability and price is unknown.
Mechanisms to Address 
Uncertainty in Water Quality 
trading Markets
Many mechanisms are available for 
mitigating risks. Mechanisms to 
address these risks can be employed 
in tandem or individually, depending 
on the program’s goals, needs, avail-
able resources, and other circum-
stances. Mechanisms include:
Biophysical and Scientific  
Uncertainty
  IMpRoved ScIence. Improved 
scientific understanding of the 
impacts that biophysical charac-
teristics have on the performance 
of BMPs leads to better predictive 
certainty about how BMPs impact 
water quality.
  dIRect MeASUReMent. Direct 
measurement of the effects of 
BMPs through monitoring before 
and after water quality effects of 
the practice captures the interan-
nual variability inherent in many 
nonpoint source BMPs.
  BMp effectIveneSS eStIMAteS. 
Effectiveness estimates based on 
the best available science reflect 
conservative average values; they 
are particularly useful in markets 
with large volumes of trades.
  eStIMAtIon toolS And ModelS. 
Estimation tools and models, 
from spreadsheets to dynamic 
models, estimate nonpoint 
source credits by allowing for 
more variables in credit calcula-
tion estimates than effectiveness 
estimates alone, thus avoiding the 
need for directly measuring pol-
lutant loads.
  tRAdIng RAtIoS. Uncertainty 
ratios serve as a margin of safety 
to ensure water quality is not de-
graded despite the variability in 
nonpoint source BMP effective-
ness. Likewise, retirement ratios 
are applied to credit transactions 
to ensure a net improvement to 
water quality.
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Extreme Event Uncertainty
  centRAlIzed cRedIt ReSeRve/
InSURAnce pool. Credit reserves 
and insurance pools hedge 
against BMP failure as a result of 
extreme weather events. 
Behavioral Uncertainty
  AggRegAtoRS. Aggregators pool 
together credits from multiple 
projects and act as intermediaries 
between buyers and sellers, ab-
sorbing the up-front capital risks 
and liability.
  Self-InSURAnce. Self-insurance 
for aggregators absorbs liability 
and protects them from the risks 
of projects failing to generate suf-
ficient credits.
  veRIfIcAtIon. Common in water 
quality trading programs, verifi-
cation confirms that a practice is 
installed and maintained to meet 
design specifications, creating a 
system of transparency, account-
ability, and consequences for 
noncompliance.
  ShARed fInAncIAl lIABIlItY. With 
shared liability, the seller shares 
financial liability for regulatory 
noncompliance with the regu-
lated buyer, thereby mitigating 
risks associated with behavioral 
uncertainty.
Regulatory Uncertainty
  gRAndfAtheRIng. Grandfathering 
guarantees to buyers and sellers 
that already certified or sold cred-
its will remain valid for the life of 
the contract if regulations change.
  AgRIcUltURAl ceRtAIntY  
pRogRAMS. Certainty programs 
recognize precompliance credit-
generating activities as sufficient 
for meeting future regulations.
  StAndARdS foR WAteR QUAlItY 
tRAdIng pRogRAM deSIgn And 
IMpleMentAtIon. Policies pro-
mote consistency and transpar-
ency among programs, which 
provides assurance to the public 
and market participants.
Market Uncertainty
  pReIMpleMentAtIon ceRtIfIcA-
tIon. Certifying credits before 
BMPs are implemented lowers 
the risk to sellers, who may hesi-
tate to install practices without 
a guarantee that the generated 
credits will be sold.
  cRedIt BAnkS/cleARInghoUSeS. 
Banks serve as brokers or clear-
inghouses for credits, offering 
buyers and sellers an attractive 
option for transacting credits  
efficiently and with low risk.
  goveRnMent gUARAntee  
pRogRAM. Government guarantee 
programs protect early actors by 
agreeing to purchase credits that 
go unsold.
The benefits and drawbacks of 
each risk mitigation option should 
be carefully considered along with 
region-specific factors such as avail-
able data, tools, and resources, as 
well as the presence of policies that 
may impact or guide the trading 
program. In the end, water quality 
trading programs should be designed 
in such a way that water quality  
goals can be achieved in a cost- 
effective manner and uncertainty  
is minimized.
In the end, water quality trading  
programs should be designed in  
such a way that water quality goals  
can be achieved in a cost-effective  
manner and uncertainty is minimized.
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I. IntRodUctIon
In the United States, over half of 
assessed water bodies were impaired 
for their designated uses in 2010 
(U.S. EPA 2010). Many of these 
impairments were from excessive 
nutrients. Agricultural runoff, waste-
water, and urban runoff are common 
sources of nutrients in our water-
ways. Increasingly, the discharge of 
nutrients is being regulated through 
individual source permit limits and 
other local regulations, in which 
total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) 
often serve as the basis for allocating 
allowable loads (see Box 1). Water 
quality trading is one mechanism 
that states and local governments are 
exploring as a means of reducing the 
costs of controlling nutrients. Water 
quality trading allows sources with 
high abatement costs to purchase 
credits, or units of reduced pollution, 
from sources with lower abatement 
costs. Water quality trading is also 
used in cases where new and expand-
ing sources of nutrients in a water-
shed must offset their nutrient load 
through the purchase of offsets.  
Water quality trading can take place 
between two or more point sources 
that discharge pollutants from single, 
identifiable sources such as pipes. 
Trading might also occur between 
a regulated point source and an 
unregulated nonpoint source. A non-
point source is a source of pollution 
that is diffuse in nature, for example, 
agricultural runoff. In many cases, 
agricultural sources may be able to 
reduce nutrient pollution at lower 
cost than traditional point source 
emitters. Therefore, water quality 
trading programs between point and 
nonpoint sources can save money 
for permitted point sources needing 
to reduce their pollutant load, and 
generate additional revenue for non-
point sources that generate credits, 
ensuring that water quality targets 
are met in a cost-effective manner. 
Most water quality trading programs 
currently active in the United States 
allow point to nonpoint source  
trading (see Figure 1) (Selman et  
al. 2009).
“Under section 303(d) of the Clean Water  
Act, states, territories, and authorized tribes  
are required to develop lists of impaired  
waters. These are waters that are too  
polluted or otherwise degraded to meet the  
water quality standards set by states, territo-
ries, or authorized tribes. The law requires  
that these jurisdictions establish priority  
rankings for waters on the lists and develop 
Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) for  
these waters. A TMDL is a calculation of the 
maximum amount of a pollutant that a water-
body can receive and still safely meet water 
quality standards.”*
The TMDL’s maximum pollutant load is 
allocated to point and nonpoint sources in 
the watershed. Point sources receive waste-
load allocations, which are incorporated as 
water-quality-based effluent limitations in 
their National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System permits. Permitted entities with an 
allocated pollutant load can use trading in lieu 
of investing in expensive onsite technological 
upgrades to more cost-effectively achieve their 
cap. The presence of TMDLs can also spur 
local regulations on pollutant loads from other 
sectors, such as private developers, who can 
also participate in trading.**
* U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2013. “Impaired Waters and Total Maximum Daily Loads.” Available at:  
<http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/>. 
** Selman, M., S. Greenhalgh, E. Branosky, C. Jones, and J. Guiling. 2009. “Water Quality Trading: An International Overview.” Washington, DC: World 
Resources Institute. Available at: <http://www.wri.org/publication/water-quality-trading-programs-international-overview>.
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As water quality markets continue 
to emerge and mature as a compli-
ance tool for regulated point sources, 
it becomes increasingly important 
to ensure that these programs are 
designed to protect water quality as 
well as to create efficient and credible 
markets for the participants. When 
developed well, water quality trad-
ing programs will ensure that market 
participants have confidence in the 
trading program and be willing to 
engage in transactions. As a result, 
the cost of achieving water quality 
standards may be less than it would 
be using only traditional command 
and control approaches (Faeth 
2000; Selman et al. 2009). However, 
there are uncertainties inherent in 
any environmental market about 
whether credits represent real and 
equitable offsets to regulated loads, 
the behavior of the participants, and 
the strength of the market. These 
real or perceived risks that are gener-
ated as a result of these uncertainties 
can break public trust and jeopardize 
cost effectiveness. 
One of the most persistent areas of 
uncertainty in water quality markets 
centers on nonpoint source reduc-
tions from agricultural practices. 
Unlike point sources (e.g., wastewa-
ter treatment plants), which often 
discharge from a pipe, nonpoint 
sources of pollution (e.g., farms) 
are difficult to measure or estimate 
because they are diffuse in nature. 
Whereas the treatment effects of 
point source pollution controls are 
perceived to be certain, nonpoint 
source control treatment is perceived 
to be uncertain due to the variable 
nature of nonpoint source pollution. 
There is a widespread perception of 
reduced certainty of control when 
MAp of U.S. poInt to nonpoInt WAteR QUAlItY tRAdIng pRogRAMS
fI
g
U
R
e 
1
Source: Willamette Partnership 2012
State Trading Policy, Guidance, Or Rule
Nutrient Trading Program
Temperature Trading Program
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nonpoint source pollution reduc-
tions are substituted for point source 
pollution reductions in a trading pro-
gram, thus resulting in the potential 
to degrade water quality if nonpoint 
source reductions are insufficient 
(Shortle and Horan 2008). In addi-
tion to uncertainty about nonpoint 
source reductions, water quality 
trading markets also can face uncer-
tainty regarding participant behav-
ior, regulations, and supply and 
demand in the market. 
The purpose of this paper is to 
establish a framework that identifies 
types of uncertainties and risks that 
are common in water quality trading 
programs, as well as some common 
mechanisms for addressing them. 
Adequately addressing uncertainty, 
especially the types of uncertainty 
arising from the participation of agri-
cultural nonpoint sources, can mean 
the difference between a vibrant 
water quality trading market that 
capitalizes on the most cost-effective 
pollutant mitigation measures and a 
stagnant, or nonexistent, market in 
which permitted entities must either 
invest in expensive technological 
upgrades or fail to meet permit limits 
and accommodate growing popula-
tions. As water quality markets have 
developed and evolved over the 
years, each program has developed 
unique approaches to address uncer-
tainties and risks associated with 
agricultural nonpoint source credits 
as well as other market uncertain-
ties. We hope this paper will serve as 
a foundation to engage federal and 
state agencies, program developers, 
and stakeholders in a national dia-
logue about guidelines for addressing 
uncertainty and risk in water quality 
markets. Effectively addressing these 
uncertainties will be crucial to ensur-
ing the success of these markets and 
to improving water quality.
The forms of uncertainty1 described 
in this paper include:
  BIophYSIcAl And ScIentIfIc  
UnceRtAIntY. Uncertainty as to 
how activities on the land, espe-
cially agricultural best manage-
ment practices (BMPs) such as 
forest buffers or cover crops, 
perform given natural variations 
in weather, as well as uncertainty 
regarding our ability to accurately 
predict and estimate the perfor-
mance of these activities. 
  extReMe event UnceRtAIntY.  
Uncertainty associated with 
extreme or stochastic events that 
can lead to failure of nonpoint 
source control measures.
  BehAvIoRAl UnceRtAIntY. Uncer-
tainty associated with whether or 
not the credit seller will abide by 
the agreement and implement the 
BMP as planned.
  RegUlAtoRY UnceRtAIntY.  
Uncertainty emanating from 
wariness about participating in 
the trading market because of the 
potential for policies to change in 
the future that could affect credit 
generation and sales. 
  MARket UnceRtAIntY. Uncertainty 
about the potential mismatch 
between supply and demand and 
how trading revenue will compare 
to foregone crop revenue.
To identify ways in which uncer-
tainty is addressed, or could be 
addressed, in water quality trading 
programs, we reviewed literature on 
trading, water quality trading pro-
grams, and interviewed water quality 
trading practitioners throughout the 
United States. 
We hope this paper will serve 
as a foundation to engage federal 
and state agencies, program 
developers, and stakeholders in a 
national dialogue about guidelines 
for addressing uncertainty and risk in 
water quality markets. 
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II. tYpeS of 
UnceRtAIntY In WAteR 
QUAlItY tRAdIng 
MARketS
We have divided uncertainties within 
water quality markets into five main 
categories. These categories include 
uncertainty about the performance 
and estimation of nonpoint source 
reductions themselves, uncertainty 
due to extreme events, buyer  
uncertainty about nonpoint  
source implementation, and seller 
uncertainty about market and  
regulatory dynamics. 
Biophysical & Scientific 
Uncertainty 
Biophysical and scientific uncertainty 
refers to the uncertainty inherent 
in predicting and measuring the 
benefits of land-based mitigation 
activities given the unpredictability 
of the natural world. In water quality 
trading programs where nonpoint 
sources can participate in the market, 
these types of land-based activities 
might include implementation  
of agricultural or urban BMPs 
like riparian buffers or bioswales. 
Because nonpoint source pollution  
is diffuse and traverses over and 
under landscapes, it is challenging  
to predict with certainty the actual 
pollution reductions that are gener-
ated as a result of BMP implemen-
tation, even with the best available 
science. This form of uncertainty 
is especially relevant in regulatory 
markets where nonpoint source 
reductions are being applied toward 
a point source’s permit obligations.
The effectiveness of BMPs can vary 
by location, soil type, topographical  
features, season, weather, and also 
by existing crop management system, 
in the case of agricultural BMPs. 
For example, cover crops planted to 
reduce nutrient losses in areas with 
highly erodible soils may be more 
effective than cover crops planted 
in areas with relatively stable soils. 
Therefore, effectiveness is subject 
to variation based on the specific 
landscape where BMPs are applied. 
Weather patterns and seasonal varia-
tions in temperature and climate also 
impact the effectiveness of BMPs, 
leading to annual and interannual 
variability. Drainage ditches, for 
example, could flood during periods  
of rainfall and no longer provide 
their service of slowly filtering 
nutrients. If not accounted for, this 
temporal uncertainty regarding the 
interannual variability of nonpoint 
source credits may affect a credit 
buyer’s permit compliance. There 
may be a time lag between when 
a BMP is implemented and when 
it becomes fully effective, and/or 
between when reductions achieved  
at the mitigation site are actually 
realized in the waterbody of interest.  
For example, when planted, a 
riparian forest buffer composed of 
saplings will not be very effective 
in reducing nutrient runoff, but its 
effectiveness will increase as the 
trees grow and increase their filtra-
tion capacity. Likewise, the impact 
of a mature riparian buffer may be 
immediate at the project site, but the 
downstream benefits to the water-
body of interest may take months or 
even years to become evident due to 
lag times in the subsurface transport 
of nutrients and/or the presence of 
impoundments such as dams, which 
can impede surface water flows. 
extreme event Uncertainty
Extreme events—such as fire, flood, 
drought, disease, and earthquakes—
may not only compromise the effec-
tiveness of land-based mitigation 
activities, but may also render them 
completely ineffective. In particular, 
stochastic weather events like floods 
and drought pose risks to agricul-
tural production systems. A producer 
might reduce fertilizer use as a way 
of reducing nutrient runoff, but a 
Addressing Risk and Uncertainty in Water Quality Trading Markets
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in an environmental market that 
typically involves multiyear agree-
ments. For example, the agricultural 
community may face uncertainty 
about the possible impact of changes 
in agricultural regulations or market  
policies, in particular, policies 
around trading eligibility. In water 
quality trading, nonpoint sources 
generally have a baseline require-
ment that must be met before being 
eligible to trade. If the baseline 
changes in future years, activities 
that generate credits today may not 
be eligible in the future. Producers 
may find it too risky to commit to 
and implement multiyear projects if 
they believe financial compensation 
for their efforts is in jeopardy. There-
fore, unless the water quality market 
has a mechanism for addressing this 
type of regulatory uncertainty, credit 
supply may suffer.
Similarly, when new regulations 
are imminent, producers may face 
uncertainty about how their pre-
compliance actions will be treated 
once the regulations are in place. 
For example, if a trading program 
severe storm or flooding event may 
cause greater nitrogen runoff than 
would have occurred on an average 
year. Similarly, a drought might kill 
a stand of trees planted as riparian 
shade, and hurricane winds may 
blow down a riparian fence meant to 
exclude cows from the stream.
Biophysical uncertainty includes 
natural variations in weather due to 
seasons and historical weather pat-
terns. Extreme events are those that 
are largely unpredictable. With cli-
mate change we might expect more 
extreme events than in the past, 
which will increase the risk of failure 
of land-based mitigation activities. 
Behavioral Uncertainty
In water quality trading markets, 
there may be uncertainty as to 
whether the credit seller will properly 
install and maintain a BMP through-
out its life. This type of behavioral 
risk might be characterized as 
moral hazard. Moral hazard refers 
to “imperfect information about 
farmers’ actual compliance” (Hart 
and Latacz-Lohmann 2005). Lack 
of certainty regarding seller behav-
ior can result in potential buyers 
perceiving that there is an increased 
risk that agricultural sellers will 
not honor their trade agreements 
and maintain BMPs as promised. 
Because agricultural nonpoint source 
sellers are generally unregulated, 
there is asymmetrical risk borne 
between the buyer and the seller if a 
BMP that is generating offsets fails. 
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 
when a regulated point source pur-
chases credits from an unregulated 
nonpoint source, the legal liability of 
meeting the permit remains with the 
buyer. Thus, for example, if an agri-
cultural producer fails to implement 
BMPs in accordance with the trade 
agreement, it is the point source that 
could be found in violation of its 
permit, not the credit seller. Given 
this legal reality, permitted entities 
may find it too risky to enter into an 
agreement in which there is uncer-
tainty regarding the seller’s actions 
and the reductions achieved (Selman 
et al. 2009).
Imperfect information becomes 
problematic when also combined 
with inadequate enforcement of 
seller activities and/or from the dif-
ficulty of verifying certain behavioral 
practices that cannot be empirically 
observed (e.g., nutrient manage-
ment). When prospective buyers 
perceive that enforcement of seller 
activities is inadequate, their own 
perceived risk for exposure to legal 
liability may increase. 
Regulatory Uncertainty
Regulatory uncertainty refers to 
wariness about how potential future 
changes in policies could affect credit 
generation and sales. An uncertain 
regulatory landscape could prevent 
buyers or sellers from participating 
With climate change we might 
expect more extreme events than 
in the past, which will increase 
the risk of failure of land-based 
mitigation activities.
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Agricultural producers may also face 
uncertainty around credit prices and 
commodity prices. Because imple-
menting practices to generate credits 
could restrict their ability to react to 
changes in the commodity market, 
producers may need some income 
assurances if they are to commit to 
multiyear projects. 
Likewise, buyers may face uncer-
tainty about whether there will be 
adequate supply of credits. Buyers 
who need to purchase credits to meet 
permit limits or offset growth may 
find it risky to rely on future credits 
whose availability is unknown and 
out of their control.
III. MechAnISMS to 
AddReSS UnceRtAIntY 
In WAteR QUAlItY 
tRAdIng MARketS
There are mechanisms available 
for addressing uncertainty in water 
quality trading markets. Uncertainty 
ratios are one common mecha-
nism employed when trades occur 
between a regulated point source and 
a nonpoint source. Uncertainty ratios 
are applied when pollutant credits 
cannot be exchanged on a one-to-one 
basis to discount or normalize credits 
being exchanged (U.S. EPA 2009). 
However, uncertainty ratios only 
address certain forms of uncertainty, 
notably biophysical and scientific 
uncertainty associated with non-
point source credits. In designing a 
water quality trading program, it is 
important that policymakers identify 
specific causes of uncertainty and 
develop appropriate mechanisms 
for mitigating these uncertainties. 
Each mechanism presented below 
addresses certain types of uncer-
tainty and has unique benefits and 
drawbacks. This paper does not 
is under development, and it estab-
lishes a date of eligibility, (e.g., 
practices can only generate credits 
if implemented after 2013), a pro-
ducer may find it too risky to invest 
in BMPs before the date of eligibility 
is established because the pollutant 
reductions generated by the BMPs 
implemented before that date could 
not be sold as credits. 
Finally, regulatory uncertainty may 
arise when there is a risk of litiga-
tion. In the Chesapeake Bay, for 
example, a lawsuit was filed chal-
lenging the legality of water quality 
trading (Food and Water Watch et 
al. vs. U.S. EPA) (Wheeler 2012). 
Similar concerns with water quality 
trading have arisen in other emerg-
ing markets; for example, Northwest 
Environmental Advocates sent a let-
ter to U.S. EPA Region 10 calling for 
better oversight of trading in Oregon 
in relation to the Clean Water Act 
(Northwest Environmental Advo-
cates 2013). When the trading 
programs themselves are challenged, 
buyers as well as sellers are reluctant 
to enter the market. Furthermore 
state agencies may be reluctant to 
certify credits or approve trades if 
the trading program is threatened by 
legal action. 
Market Uncertainty
Market uncertainty refers to uncer-
tainties that affect willingness to 
participate in the market due to 
the unknown financial benefits or 
consequences of trading. Particularly 
in the early stages of a water qual-
ity trading market, potential sellers 
may be reluctant to enter the mar-
ketplace if there is uncertainty about 
demand for their credits. As in any 
market, there is no guarantee that 
when a good is produced, there will 
be a demand for that good. Produc-
ers may invest time, energy, and 
resources into certifying credits for 
sale in a water quality market, but 
these investments can be risky if 
demand is low or unknown. Further-
more, if practices are implemented 
before credits are certified and sold, 
the producer will face uncertainty 
about whether a buyer will be willing 
to pay enough money per credit to 
cover the cost of implementation. 
In designing a water quality trading 
program, it is important that 
policymakers identify specific  
causes of uncertainty and develop 
appropriate mechanisms for mitigating 
these uncertainties.
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make recommendations about which 
mechanisms are the best; rather, it 
presents the variety of mechanisms 
that are appropriate for each type of 
uncertainty and the pros and cons of 
each of these mechanisms. 
Mechanisms for Addressing 
Biophysical and Scientific 
Uncertainty
Biophysical and scientific uncertain-
ties associated with the effectiveness  
of nonpoint source mitigation  
practices can be addressed in several 
ways. First, the science of biophysical 
fluctuations and processes might be 
improved to increase our knowledge 
of practice effectiveness, allowing us 
to better predict the impact of certain 
activities on nonpoint source runoff. 
Secondly, direct measurement or 
improved estimation methods can 
be used to more accurately quantify 
reductions from nonpoint source 
mitigation practices. Finally, bio-
physical and scientific uncertainty 
can be addressed through use of 
trading ratios applied to nonpoint 
source reduction estimates to 
account for uncertainties in science 
and measurement methods. Water 
quality trading programs typically 
use a combination of these mecha-
nisms to reduce biophysical and 
scientific uncertainty associated  
with nonpoint source credits.
Improved Science
Quantifying the environmental 
impacts of agricultural systems and 
management practices is an ongoing 
field of research. Scientific observa-
tions and studies are important  
for examining and characterizing  
the impacts that biophysical char-
acteristics (e.g., soil, weather) have 
on farm losses as well as the per-
formance of nonpoint source BMPs 
in reducing these losses. Having 
sufficient scientific understanding 
and data helps to describe these 
relationships and leads to better 
predictive certainty about how agri-
cultural systems and BMPs impact 
water quality. By improving scien-
tific understanding, we can begin to 
reduce the uncertainties associated 
with estimating nonpoint source 
loads. Integrating improved science 
into a water quality trading program 
is generally done through adaptive  
management processes, where 
improved science is integrated into 
the program systematically as part 
of a process to iteratively improve 
management as new information 
becomes available.
Direct Measurement
Direct measurement is one possible 
way to determine the environmental 
impact of nonpoint source BMPs with 
greater certainty. Direct measure-
ment of the effects of BMPs involves 
monitoring before and after water 
quality effects of the practice, either 
through in-field measurements, 
edge-of-field measurements, or in-
stream sampling. When there is an 
ideal situation for monitoring BMPs 
(e.g., when there is a drainage pipe 
for the field or some other direct out-
let for runoff), direct measurement 
may leave the least room for uncer-
tainty regarding whether the BMP is 
performing properly.
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estimation methods, other sources 
and controls in the watershed and 
the potential for noise (i.e., moni-
toring errors) in the observation 
make it difficult to ensure changes in 
runoff or in-stream concentrations 
are accurate and solely attribut-
able to the nonpoint source BMP 
that was implemented to generate 
credits (Willamette Partnership et 
al. 2012). Furthermore, depending 
on the monitoring program’s design, 
it may take years or even decades 
to capture temporal lags in water 
quality improvement that result from 
the implementation of the BMP. For 
these reasons, monitoring may be 
best suited in areas where the infra-
structure and expertise is already in 
place and where pollutant loads are 
primarily from surface water that can 
be closely monitored.
In California’s San Joaquin valley, 
the Grassland Area Tradable Loads 
Program for salinity is one such 
example of a water quality trading 
program where direct monitoring 
was cost effective. Now inactive, 
the program directly monitored 
selenium loads but was considered 
to have low administrative costs 
because a monitoring system was 
already in place that the trading 
program could use without investing 
significantly in additional infrastruc-
ture or labor (Morgan and Wolverton 
2005). The Grassland Tradable Load 
program operated in an area with 
irrigated agriculture with ditches and 
irrigation pipes, which were condu-
cive to monitoring activities. For this 
program, direct measurement was 
decided to be the most appropriate 
method given the available resources 
and infrastructure already in place.
Because a direct monitoring 
approach can capture interannual 
variability inherent in many non-
point source BMPs, it may reduce 
biophysical uncertainty but may 
actually introduce increased market 
uncertainty. As credits awarded on 
the basis of actual monitoring are 
likely to fluctuate annually, it is likely 
that a monitoring approach will 
introduce uncertainty about year-to-
year credit supply in any project. 
BMP Effectiveness Estimates
Compared to direct monitoring, non-
point source BMP effectiveness esti-
mates can offer a less expensive and 
resource-intensive mechanism for 
mitigating biophysical and scientific 
uncertainty. Effectiveness estimates 
are “based on the best available sci-
ence that connects a specific BMP 
to the percent or mass reduction in 
a pollutant following installation of 
that BMP” (Willamette Partnership 
et al. 2012). This method often relies 
on scientific observations that have 
already been collected and published 
in the literature. In some cases, it 
may be necessary to cull the litera-
ture, or even conduct monitoring or 
modeling studies, to develop average 
Compared to direct monitoring,  
nonpoint source BMP effectiveness 
estimates can offer a less expensive  
and resource-intensive mechanism  
for mitigating biophysical and  
scientific uncertainty.
The design of Idaho’s Lower Boise 
River Effluent Trading Demonstra-
tion Project has two options for 
assessing the effectiveness of agricul-
tural BMPs at treating phosphorus: 
directly measuring BMP reduc-
tions, where possible, or calculating 
estimates when direct monitoring is 
not feasible. The latter method uses 
uncertainty discounts for each BMP, 
reducing the number of credits that 
can be sold. If reductions can be,  
and are, directly measured per  
monitoring specifications, the Lower 
Boise River Effluent Trading Dem-
onstration Project does not discount 
the reductions for uncertainty  
(Ross & Associates Environmental 
Consulting, Ltd. 2000).
However, monitoring requires 
sophisticated system design and 
implementation and is typically 
labor and cost intensive (Abdalla et 
al. 2007). As a result, it is not com-
monly used to quantify nonpoint 
source reductions in environmental 
markets. And although taking direct 
measurements has the potential to 
generate more accurate results than 
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efficiencies specific to the water qual-
ity trading market region. However, 
it is likely that the resources involved 
to do this exercise would still be 
less than those required to directly 
monitor the effects of each individual 
nonpoint source BMP, and costs 
would decrease over time following 
the initial exercise of establishing 
set efficiencies for each BMP (Wil-
lamette Partnership et al. 2012). 
Because effectiveness estimates rely 
on values from published scientific 
studies, they are subject to the same 
scientific uncertainties inherent in 
direct monitoring. In cases where 
estimated impacts of nonpoint 
source BMPs are derived based on 
a small body of literature values, 
there is greater uncertainty about the 
actual range of BMP effectiveness.
In the Chesapeake Bay watershed, 
the University of Maryland (UMD) 
completed a multiyear literature 
review on the nutrient and sediment 
reduction efficiencies of urban and 
agricultural BMPs (Simpson and 
Weammert 2009). The report only 
included studies that took place in 
the Bay watershed, or in some cases, 
in similar climatic and geologic 
regions. A panel of experts from the 
Chesapeake Bay used the results of 
the meta-analysis to develop average 
efficiencies for BMPs, which were 
then incorporated into the Chesa-
peake Bay Watershed Model. BMP 
efficiencies adopted by the panel 
often vary in effectiveness based on 
hydrogeomorphic region and land 
use. In addition, for all Chesapeake 
Bay BMP effectiveness estimates, 
averages and ranges were set con-
servatively in order to account for 
variations in effectiveness depending 
on location, weather, temporal lags, 
and installation and maintenance 
issues, thereby reducing the uncer-
tainty around these issues (Simpson 
and Weammert 2009). (See Box 2 
for more information on temporal 
compliance uncertainty.)
As a result of this comprehensive 
and conservative exercise to estimate 
BMP effectiveness, Maryland’s and 
Pennsylvania’s nutrient trading pro-
grams use these BMP efficiencies for 
estimating at least some of the non-
point source credits in their trading 
programs. Moreover, because of the 
widespread buy-in from U.S. EPA, 
states, and other stakeholders on the 
reliability of the estimates, Maryland 
and Pennsylvania programs deter-
mined that the BMP efficiency esti-
mates developed through this pro-
cess were suitably conservative and 
therefore do not apply any additional 
uncertainty ratios to nonpoint source 
trades whose credits were generated 
using these estimates (Maryland 
Department of Agriculture 2008; 
Pennsylvania Environmental Qual-
ity Board 2010). While conservative 
effectiveness estimates may alleviate 
uncertainty associated with BMP 
performance, there is a tradeoff in 
terms of credit supply in the market 
and the resulting credit price. Using 
carefully developed effectiveness 
estimates which account for bio-
physical and scientific uncertainty 
can provide consistency and predict-
ability when estimating nonpoint 
source credits. On the other hand, 
using overly conservative estimates 
Regulated point source compliance is tracked 
annually, or sometimes monthly or seasonally. 
Thus, if the efficiencies or models used  
to estimate credits do not adequately take  
into account annual and interannual variability 
of nonpoint source practices, there is a risk of 
temporal permit exceedances on the part of the 
regulated point source that satisfies its permit 
requirements using nonpoint source credits. 
for example, let’s say a regulated point source 
purchases 100 nonpoint source nitrogen  
credits per year. The 100 nitrogen credits rep-
resent the average nitrogen reduction achieved 
by a riparian buffer annually. However, in any 
given year, the actual nonpoint source reduc-
tions may be higher or lower than 100 pounds 
of nitrogen. for years when the actual nitrogen 
reduction is lower than 100 pounds, it could 
ultimately lead to water quality degradation 
in that particular year. If nonpoint source 
credits are not estimated using appropriately 
conservative factors or with factors that do 
not account for temporal variability, then an 
explicit uncertainty ratio may be necessary  
so that a margin of safety is in place that 
ensures permit requirements are met. In  
cases where credit purchasers themselves 
have estimated credit needs based on  
annual averages, these types of safety margins 
specific to overcoming temporal variation are 
likely not necessary. for example, if a state 
requires that a developer offset their storm- 
water nutrient load from a new housing devel-
opment, this offset requirement is likely to be 
estimated using average runoff estimates. In 
this case, compliance is not estimated annu-
ally, but rather estimated based on an average. 
Thus, credits generated based on similar 
estimation assumptions should adequately 
achieve the margin of safety.
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could unnecessarily reduce trading 
volumes and reduce the expected 
efficiency gains.
Estimation Tools and Models
Estimation tools and models can be 
useful mechanisms for estimating 
nonpoint source credits by allow-
ing for more variables in credit 
calculations than BMP effectiveness 
estimates alone and by avoiding the 
need for directly measuring pollut-
ant loads. By building or adapting 
site-scale models to account for 
natural fluctuations and variable 
BMP performance, models may 
reduce uncertainties around esti-
mates of nonpoint source reduc-
tions. These tools and models help 
estimate the current nonpoint source 
pollutant loads coming from a given 
parcel. Models themselves might 
use BMP effectiveness estimates or 
might employ a more process-based 
method for determining BMP effec-
tiveness under variable biophysical 
conditions. Tools and models are 
typically calibrated to real-world 
water quality data and thus, whether 
using effectiveness estimates or not, 
are linked to the quality and avail-
ability of scientific data.
There are several different 
approaches to nonpoint source credit 
estimation that have been adopted 
by water quality trading programs 
in the United States. These include 
the use of lookup tables, spreadsheet 
tools, and process-based models. 
These approaches are described in 
more detail below. 
lookUp tABleS. Virginia’s  
Nutrient Credit Exchange  
Program currently uses lookup 
tables, which provide average 
nutrient loading rates based on 
the Chesapeake Bay Watershed 
Model’s average land use loading 
rates and average BMP efficiencies. 
This approach is simple and has the 
advantage of providing assurance to 
the landowner that the specific load 
reductions credited to a practice are 
constant and known for each water-
shed and do not require estimation 
on the part of the landowner. How-
ever, because the nutrient reduc-
tion values are based on average 
watershed load values, it is likely that 
there is a high degree of interfarm 
variability that is not accounted for. 
Thus at the farm scale, this approach 
can introduce uncertainty regarding 
the accuracy of the values. 
SIMple ModelS. Using simple models 
or spreadsheet-based tools is another 
approach used by several water qual-
ity trading programs. In particular, 
the Great Miami River Watershed 
Trading Pilot uses the U.S. EPA 
Region 5 spreadsheet tool to estimate 
phosphorus credits from agriculture 
(Selman et al. 2009). This tool uses a 
simplified version of the Revised Uni-
versal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE) to 
estimate soil loss, and subsequently 
phosphorus loss, before and after 
treatment with BMPs. Effectiveness 
estimates are used to estimate the 
BMP load reductions. The spread-
sheet is simple and easy to use, and 
provides some on-farm specificity by 
using RUSLE as well as soil informa-
tion. 
pRoceSS-BASed ModelS. Dynamic 
models are also being explored as 
tools that can help predict agricul-
tural nutrient and sediment losses 
based on site-specific data. For ex-
ample, USDA’s Nutrient Tracking 
Tool (NTT) (used in Maryland, and 
being piloted in several water quality 
trading programs in the Northwest 
and the Chesapeake Bay) uses the 
Agricultural Policy Extender (APEX) 
model to estimate agricultural reduc-
tions from modeled farm loads based 
on on-farm characteristics such as 
soil type and weather, in addition to 
current and planned farm manage-
ment characteristics such as tillage 
operations, fertilizer applications, 
and crop rotations (Texas A&M 
University 2013). By accounting for 
location-specific characteristics such 
as soil and weather, biophysical vari-
ability can be accounted for. How-
ever, the degree to which biophysical 
uncertainty is reduced depends on 
the quality of data and science un-
derlying the model, and the  
degree to which the model has been 
calibrated to real-world results. The 
Several different approaches to 
nonpoint source credit estimation have 
been adopted by water quality trading 
programs in the United States.
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use of process-based models may 
cause some users to question the 
nonpoint source estimate results, 
because models may appear to lack 
transparency about their assump-
tions and processes. Only through 
adequate testing, refinement and 
calibration of these models, and re-
view and buy-in from stakeholders,  
will these uncertainties be overcome. 
Some trading program administra-
tors have suggested that model un-
certainty could be quantified by esti-
mating the potential for model error. 
A confidence interval could then be 
used to determine if an uncertainty  
ratio is warranted for the modeled 
results and if so, what magnitude is 
appropriate (Fox 2013).
When models are used to quantify 
the environmental impacts of BMPs, 
they have their own set of uncertain-
ties associated with them. Model 
uncertainties generally pertain to  
the accuracy and reliability of the 
estimates, or output. Model uncer-
tainty can be addressed through  
various mechanisms, such as the 
use of implicit assumptions and the 
quantification of the standard devia-
tion of modeled results.
Trading Ratios
Trading ratios are a policy mecha-
nism for explicitly addressing any 
remaining scientific and biophysical 
uncertainties that have not already 
been addressed through the credit 
quantification process. The following 
sections examine two common types 
of trading ratios applied in existing  
water quality trading programs: 
the uncertainty ratio, applied to 
generally address uncertainties of 
quantification, and the retirement 
ratio, applied to ensure that the trade 
benefits water quality. 
Uncertainty Ratios
Uncertainty ratios “account for  
the variability in effectiveness of  
nonpoint source BMPs based on  
scientific uncertainty or random  
weather fluctuations” (Branosky  
et al. 2007). Although definitions  
vary by program, uncertainty ratios  
are typically used to ensure that an  
adequate reduction (in the case of  
nutrients) from a nonpoint source  
is achieved to offset the exact  
reduction required of the point 
source (Vogel and Szeptycki 2012). 
They serve as a margin of safety that, 
in light of uncertainties associated 
with nonpoint source reductions, 
aims to prevent the possibility of 
a trade degrading water quality. 
While common, uncertainty ratios 
are not used by all programs. For 
those programs that do use them, the 
most common ratio is 2:1, meaning 
that two units of nonpoint source 
pollution reduction are needed to 
offset one unit of pollution from a 
regulated point source (National 
Wildlife Federation 1999). The range 
of uncertainty ratios currently used 
in water quality trading programs 
nationwide varies and can go as high 
as 3:1 (Vogel and Szeptycki 2012).
The Great Miami River Watershed 
Nutrient Trading Program adjusts its 
uncertainty ratio requirements based 
on the regulatory status of the buyer 
and the status of the point source’s 
receiving body of water. For example, 
buyers who wish to purchase credits 
before any regulations are in place 
requiring that reductions be made, 
and who discharge into fully attain-
ing waters, do not have to apply an 
uncertainty ratio presently or for 
subsequent permits; they are able to 
trade with nonpoint sources on a 1:1 
basis (i.e., no uncertainty ratio). On 
the other end of the spectrum, if  
a wastewater utility buyer needs to  
trade in order to be in compliance, 
and the utility discharges into 
impaired waters, trades with non-
point sources receive an uncertainty 
ratio of 3:1 (Water Conservation Sub-
district of The Miami Conservancy 
District 2005).
If a water quality trading program 
utilizes a nonpoint source credit esti-
mation methodology that employs 
conservative factors or is able to 
adequately model and account for 
biophysical variation, uncertainty 
ratios might be set lower than the 
typical 2:1 ratio (Horan and Shortle 
2005; Vogel and Szeptycki 2012). 
Identifying certain situations in 
which uncertainty may be greatest, 
and uncertainty ratios most appro-
priate, could help to maintain a 
trading program’s cost effectiveness 
while also ensuring water quality 
goals are met. 
Retirement Ratios
While retirement ratios play similar 
roles to the uncertainty ratio in the 
sense that they help to guarantee 
water quality is not compromised by 
a point-nonpoint source trade in the 
face of nonpoint source BMP uncer-
tainty, they are generally designed 
to serve a slightly different need. 
Retirement ratios can be applied 
to transactions in order to retire a 
certain number of credits for a net 
improvement in water quality. Mary-
land’s program uses a retirement 
ratio of 1.1:1 in which 10 percent2 
of all credits purchased by a buyer 
are retired to the state to ensure the 
program achieves a net water quality 
benefit (Maryland Department of 
Agriculture 2008).
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Aggregators
Aggregators are commonly used  
as intermediaries between buyers 
and sellers in water quality trading 
markets. Aggregators pool together 
credits from multiple projects so  
that the credits can be bundled and 
sold as a larger package than would 
otherwise be possible when acting 
individually. In many instances, an 
aggregator acts as a third-party agent 
who purchases rights to develop 
credit-generating projects on a land-
owner’s property and sells the credits 
the project generated. Because land-
owners sell rights to access their  
land and implement BMPs, rather 
than sell credits, landowners do not 
face the capital risks inherent in 
developing and marketing credits, 
particularly from structural practices 
with high up-front costs. 
Aggregators may often create a 
diverse portfolio of projects and 
credits which provides greater 
protection from one project default-
ing. From the buyer perspective, 
diversified sources of credits may be 
seen as less risky than relying on a 
single project. In addition, buyers 
can reduce risks by working through 
an aggregator because an aggregator 
will often absorb the risk of an agri-
cultural producer not complying with 
his contract by assuming liability for 
the credits, thereby creating a credit 
guarantee for the buyer (Nguyen et 
al. 2006).
Environmental Banc & Exchange 
(EBX), an aggregator working with 
agricultural producers primarily 
in Maryland, Virginia, and North 
Carolina, addresses the construction, 
credit yield, and operational risks of 
behavioral uncertainty. When EBX 
starts working with landowners, it 
pays for, manages, and controls the 
construction of the BMP(s) that is 
Mechanisms for Addressing 
Risk from extreme events
Centralized Credit Reserve/ 
Insurance Pool
Some water quality trading programs 
have established centralized credit 
reserves that can hedge against BMP 
failure as a result of weather or other 
“acts of God” (Branosky et al. 2011). 
This reserve is generally not meant  
to insulate against the risk of the 
landowner or aggregator not imple-
menting BMPs as promised, but 
rather against unforeseen and 
extreme events that cause BMP 
failure. In Pennsylvania, the credit 
reserve is established by applying  
a 10 percent reserve ratio that  
“allocates a portion of each credit 
[sold] into a credit insurance pool” 
(Branosky et al. 2011). In the  
event of a BMP failure, a regulated 
source would be allowed to draw 
from the credit reserve to replace 
credits in proportion to his loss 
for that compliance year. In this 
way, regulated sources are insu-
lated against risk of noncompliance 
related to BMP failure as a result of 
weather conditions or other unfore-
seeable circumstances. 
The Ohio River Basin Water Quality 
Trading Project also uses a reserve 
pool. The Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI), which develops 
and oversees the trading program 
and facilitates the pilot trades, sets 
aside 20 percent of all credits it 
acquires for the reserve pool. The 
reserve pool would be used if the 
BMP fails to generate the estimated 
credits—because the model’s credit 
estimates were later determined to 
be inaccurate through verification or 
the BMP failed as a result of flooding, 
for example (Fox 2013). In creat-
ing these credit reserves, the price 
of credits will increase, as with any 
trading ratio. 
Mechanisms for Addressing 
Behavioral Uncertainty
Behavioral uncertainty regarding 
whether or not the practice is  
actually being implemented and 
maintained as promised can increase 
perceived risk to potential credit 
buyers. While buyers may believe 
these risks of moral hazard are real, 
most water quality trading programs 
have multiple mechanisms in place 
to address this form of uncertainty. 
These mechanisms include using 
aggregators as intermediaries, verify-
ing that practices are in place, and 
mitigating risk through contract 
provisions for shared liability. 
Aggregators are commonly used as 
intermediaries between buyers and 
sellers in water quality trading markets.
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being implemented to generate cred-
its. By setting up the design specifi-
cations and overseeing construction, 
EBX can have assurance that the 
BMP(s) is implemented properly.
Self-Insurance
Using intermediaries for credit trans-
actions alleviates uncertainty for the 
credit generators and credit buyers, 
but the uncertainty about the non-
point source credits is transferred to 
the intermediary, who becomes the 
entity responsible for ensuring the 
point source receives the credits  
it needs. To protect themselves 
from the risks involved with bearing 
this liability, aggregators may have 
their own self-insurance policy. A 
self-insurance policy would create 
a reserve pool of credits that the 
intermediary can use in the event of 
project failure. For example, when 
EBX develops a project, it will hold 
approximately 20 to 30 percent 
of the credits back as insurance, 
depending on the degree of risk 
associated with that practice (i.e., 
structural practices carry greater 
risk). Ultimately, the cost of the 
aggregator’s self-insurance policy 
will be passed on to the buyer as a 
transaction cost. 
Verification
Verification is done in most water 
quality trading markets to confirm 
that a practice is installed and main-
tained to meet design specifications. 
Rigorous verification policies can 
help reduce the perceived behavioral  
risks on the part of the seller by 
creating a system of transparency, 
accountability, and consequences for 
noncompliance on the part of land-
owners and project developers. Veri-
fication activities provide certainty to 
credit buyers that the credits meet the 
program standards, and they provide 
certainty to program administrators 
and the public that offsets are “real” 
and trades are not compromising 
water quality (Willamette Partner-
ship 2009).
Verification may be conducted by 
certified third parties, a state agency 
or other program administrator staff, 
or the project developers them-
selves. Some trading programs, like 
the Tar-Pamlico and Great Miami 
River basin, only spot-check a small 
percentage of all projects. Other 
programs, including the Lower Boise 
(ID) and Red Cedar (WI), require 
third-party verification of all credit-
generating projects on an annual 
basis (Morgan and Wolverton 2005). 
Verification tends to occur after 
projects are first installed and then 
annually, or every few years, there-
after. The process involves ensuring 
the credits were calculated using the 
appropriate methodology, and that 
the estimates are relatively accurate, 
checking the project’s eligibility,  
and monitoring installed BMPs  
for specifications and functionality 
(Willamette Partnership et al. 2012).
The Willamette Partnership has 
a robust framework for verifying 
credits in the Rogue River basin. It 
requires third-party verification by 
accredited verifiers in the first year 
of the project to confirm project 
eligibility, accurate credit quantities, 
and appropriate plans and funds for 
long-term maintenance. Verifications 
occur annually thereafter through 
the life of the project. Annual verifi-
cation activities include monitoring 
that the practices are in place and 
reporting on their performance. 
Every fifth, tenth, and twentieth 
years, full verification is required—
including a site visit. When the veri-
fier estimates the amount of credits 
that the generating project is produc-
ing, the estimate must be within 15 
percent of the project developer’s 
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estimate in order for the project to be 
successfully verified. The 15 percent 
threshold allows room for variation 
in calculation and sampling methods 
(Willamette Partnership 2009).
Shared financial Liability
Under the Clean Water Act, a regu-
lated point source cannot transfer 
regulatory liability. Thus, in a water 
quality trading program, a regulated  
entity that purchases credits in good  
faith only to have those credits 
become void as a result of BMP 
failure is still held liable for noncom-
pliance (U.S. EPA 2009). Inability 
to transfer liability is a considerable 
risk to a regulated buyer, both in 
terms of potential regulatory expo-
sure and financial exposure (from 
fines resulting in noncompliance). 
As a result, regulated buyers may be 
wary about entering into trades with 
nonpoint sources that are exempt 
from regulatory enforcement. Like-
wise, the producer selling the credits 
may not perceive any responsibility 
for the quality of the credits gener-
ated (Nguyen et al. 2006). Mecha-
nisms within buyer contracts that 
allocate financial liability between 
both buyer and seller could be an 
effective tool for mitigating risks 
associated with behavioral uncer-
tainty (Shortle and Horan 2008).
With shared liability, the pro-
ducer shares financial liability for 
regulatory noncompliance with the 
regulated buyer. Under a shared 
liability agreement, the credit seller 
is exposed to financial risk if CWA 
requirements are not met as a result 
of credit default (Willamette Partner-
ship et al. 2012). Such an arrange-
ment is used in the Chesapeake Bay 
and Colorado trading programs, 
where through contractual agree-
ments, financial liability is split 
between the two parties and enforced 
through penalties and fees (Morgan 
and Wolverton 2005).
A similar shared financial liability 
arrangement exists between The 
Freshwater Trust, an aggregator of 
temperature credits, and the City 
of Medford (Oregon). The city and 
the trust have in their credit pur-
chase agreement that if any fines 
are imposed on Medford for water 
quality violations related to credit 
failure, both the city and the trust are 
responsible for the fines (Willamette 
et al. 2012).
These arrangements may generate 
feelings of ownership over the project 
for both the buyer and the producer, 
resulting in both parties taking some 
responsibility for the ultimate suc-
cess of the BMPs and the transaction 
as a whole. However, arrangements 
in which farmers who are otherwise 
largely unregulated must assume 
partial financial responsibility for 
achieving pollutant reductions could 
be a deterrent to farmers who enter 
into trading programs voluntarily.
Mechanisms for Addressing 
Regulatory Uncertainty
While changes in the policies govern-
ing water quality markets, environ-
mental targets, and agricultural 
policy are likely unavoidable, water 
quality trading program guidance 
can be designed to alleviate concerns 
over what these changes will mean 
for credits that have already been 
certified or transacted. Mechanisms 
for addressing regulatory uncertainty 
may include grandfathering, agricul-
tural certainty programs, and devel-
oping consistency and standards 
among water quality markets.
Grandfathering
In the event of changing regulations, 
grandfathering recognizes already 
certified credits, or already sold 
credits, as valid if regulations change 
that would affect the credit calcula-
tion. For example, if the eligibility 
requirements for generating credits 
were to change, credit-generating 
projects that were implemented and 
certified under previous require-
ments would not be impacted. In this 
way, grandfathering reduces risk to 
early actors (both buyers and sellers) 
in the market.
Shared financial liability arrangements 
may generate feelings of ownership 
for both the buyer and the producer, 
resulting in both parties taking 
responsibility for the project’s success. 
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Maryland has implemented a 
grandfathering clause in its water 
quality trading program. Maryland 
uses a performance-based eligibility 
requirement for nonpoint sources 
that is derived from the Chesapeake 
Bay Watershed Model agricultural 
land-use loads (Maryland Depart-
ment of Agriculture 2008). It is 
understood that this model will be 
updated every few years and that 
the agricultural land-use loads may 
change. In addition, it may be that 
the load allocation for agriculture 
under the Chesapeake Bay TMDL 
may change in future years. Updates 
to the model and/or to the agricul-
tural load allocation will likely neces-
sitate changes to the agricultural 
eligibility requirement. With this in 
mind, Maryland’s policy stipulates 
that once credits are certified and 
sold, they remain valid for the life 
of the contract. Once the contract 
is over, the producer would have 
to reassess the credit generation 
potential of his activities. In the case 
of credits that have been certified 
but not yet sold, the producer would 
have to recalculate the amount of 
credits that his planned activities can 
generate (Payne 2012).
Grandfathering of already certified 
and/or sold credits provides a guar-
antee to both buyers and sellers that 
the credits transacted will remain 
viable for the life of the contract. 
Grandfathering may encourage early 
actors in the trading program, which 
could result in more environmental 
benefits over time. There is a risk, 
however, that grandfathering might 
uphold credits that new science or 
policy decisions deem to no longer 
be credible, leading to the potential 
compromising of water quality goals 
as long as those credits are upheld. 
Agricultural Certainty Programs
Agricultural certainty programs can 
be used to complement water quality 
trading programs by recognizing  
precompliance credit-generating 
activities as sufficient for meeting 
future regulations. In 2011,  
USDA and U.S. EPA released a 
document that provides a general 
concept for a certainty program. The 
document stated that if agricultural 
producers meet a series of criteria— 
such as developing conservation 
plans, implementing BMPs in accor-
dance with water quality goals, and 
verifying practices—the producer’s 
activities could count toward TMDL 
load allocations or other watershed 
cleanup goals, prevent any animal 
feeding operations from being classi-
fied as confined animal feeding oper-
ations (which could subject them to 
more regulations), and/or qualify 
them to be prioritized for cost-
share funding. The document also 
stated that states could design these 
programs to function with trading 
programs (USDA NRCS 2011).
According to the Maryland Depart-
ment of Agriculture, which is  
exploring the use of certainty to 
accelerate BMP implementation, 
“certainty is a voluntary approach 
supported by both the USDA and the 
U.S. EPA to provide ‛assurances’ to 
the agricultural community so that 
farmers may conduct business in 
a predictable regulatory setting in 
exchange for the implementation  
of additional best management prac-
tices (BMPs) to reduce nutrient  
runoff and erosion” (2012). Agricul-
tural producers who demonstrate 
compliance with water quality 
requirements and agree to  
monitor and report additional BMP 
activities will be certified as meeting 
regulatory requirements for the life 
of the agreement. By receiving this 
certification that they’re meeting 
requirements, they also become  
eligible to trade in Maryland’s  
nutrient trading program. 
A certainty program would allow 
agricultural producers to enter the 
trading market free from worry 
about how regulatory measures 
might affect their operations in 
the near future. This arrangement 
could motivate early adopters to 
participate in the trading program, 
resulting in more conservation on 
the ground that could improve water 
quality. Similarly to grandfathering, 
however, exempting landowners  
that enroll in the certainty program 
from future regulations may create  
significant loopholes if certainty 
requirements are significantly 
weaker than future policies or regu-
lations affecting landowners. Where 
certainty programs are linked to 
trading program baseline require-
ments, a certainty program with little 
connection to current or future water 
quality goals might result in pollu-
tion loads not being properly offset. 
Standards for Water Quality  
Trading Program Design and  
Implementation
Many water quality trading programs 
are facing legal challenges due to 
public interest concerns about water 
quality degradation resulting from 
trades. In turn, this concern about 
the public interest has resulted in 
considerable uncertainty in the 
market among buyers, sellers, and 
administrators. While U.S. EPA 
provided a water quality policy in 
2003, this policy lacked firm guid-
ance about how trading programs 
might be designed and implemented 
in ways that provided reasonable 
assurance that the conditions of the 
point source permits are being met. 
As a result, water quality trading  
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programs vary significantly and pro-
vide varying levels of rigor in terms 
of ensuring additionality, verifica-
tion, credit tracking and registration, 
and credit estimation methods. 
In order to better assure the public, 
new policy, regulations, or best  
practices might be developed by U.S. 
EPA or other agencies. These stan-
dards or best practices would create 
consistency as well as shared expec-
tations for program design, imple-
mentation, and transparency. This 
in turn would reduce uncertainty 
among participants in programs 
designed using approved standards 
or best practices as well as reduce  
the risk of litigation.
Mechanisms for Addressing 
Market Uncertainty
Because market uncertainties center 
on supply and demand dynamics, 
they are generally beyond the realm 
of the trading program and therefore 
can be difficult to address. For  
example, producers may be uncer-
tain about whether trading will 
make economic sense if crop prices 
increase next year. There are, how-
ever, some mechanisms that can be 
used to help mitigate the risks associ-
ated with market uncertainty.
Preimplementation Certification
Agricultural producers who are 
interested in trading may be uncer-
tain about demand. Will there be 
sufficient demand for the generated 
credits? Will buyers’ willingness to 
pay be enough to cover costs and  
generate profit? Trading programs  
that allow credits to be certified for  
sale before the proposed credit- 
generating practice is actually  
implemented can lower the risks  
for agricultural producers who may 
be hesitant about paying to install 
practices without being guaranteed 
that the generated credits will be 
sold. By certifying credits before 
implementation, sellers are certified 
for credits that they’re proposing to 
generate, not for credits that have 
already been generated.
Maryland allows for credit certifica-
tion on proposed credit generation 
projects (Maryland Department of 
Agriculture 2008). Interested sellers 
can use the state’s Nutrient Trading 
Tool to assess their existing nutrient  
loads, run a future scenario that 
simulates the nutrient reductions 
that would be achieved if additional 
BMPs were implemented, and esti-
mate the credits those reductions  
would generate. At that point, the 
interested seller can submit the 
results of the tool to the state for 
review and certification. Once certi-
fied, the credits can be marketed to 
buyers and would be classified as 
credits that are “planned, contingent 
on sale.” This approach prevents 
sellers from investing resources 
in generating credits before they 
are certain they will be purchased. 
Preimplementation certification 
may result in a perceived increase in 
risk to buyers facing permit limits, 
as there may be more uncertainty 
around preimplementation credits as 
compared to credits generated from 
a project already in place. Projects 
already in place reduce the potential 
for a buyer to default on his permit if 
a project is not implemented due to 
a lack of funds, bad weather, or some 
other circumstance that prevents the 
credit seller from following through 
on his or her agreement. 
Credit Bank/Clearinghouses
In the context of environmental  
markets, a credit bank is “a private  
or public entity that creates and  
sells or brokers sale of credits”  
(Commonwealth of Virginia 2011). 
Banks typically serve as clearing-
houses for credits and function as 
intermediaries between credit buyers 
and credit sellers. Entities that wish 
to buy credits can purchase credits 
from the clearinghouse which holds 
credits, or potentially pay into a 
centralized fund or bank that will use 
those funds to purchase credits from 
other sources (e.g., the agricultural 
sector or other point sources). The 
latter arrangement is similar to an 
in-lieu fee system. 
Credit banks may offer regulated 
entities an attractive option for 
obtaining credits because they 
prevent entities from having “to 
locate and purchase credits on their 
own, thereby lowering their transac-
tion costs and mitigating their risk” 
In order to better assure the public,  
new policy, regulations, or best 
practices might be developed by U.S. 
EPA or other agencies.
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(Selman et al. 2009). Agricultural 
nonpoint sources may also find 
this arrangement to be beneficial 
because, similarly to working with an 
aggregator, a credit bank would serve 
as the intermediary. In a 2012 study, 
Nguyen et al. found that a clearing-
house—that is, an entity that serves 
as an intermediary to transact all 
trades between buyers and sellers—
versus a bilateral exchange—a one-
on-one exchange between buyer and 
seller—was generally a more efficient 
design for conducting point source  
to nonpoint source trades (Nguyen  
et al. 2012). Below are examples  
of how credit banks have been  
used to reduce risk in water quality 
trading programs.
PENNVEST is an example of a 
nutrient credit clearinghouse in 
Pennsylvania. It holds auctions at 
which permitted wastewater treat-
ment plants can purchase credits to 
meet their nitrogen and phosphorus 
permit limits. PENNVEST outlines 
how its operation benefits buyers 
by remitting regulated entities of 
“adhering to regulatory procurement 
requirements, search costs, negotia-
tion costs, evaluation counterparty 
credit-worthiness, [and] contract 
enforcement” (PENNVEST 2011). 
For credit sellers, PENNVEST “can  
facilitate an increase in demand that 
makes undertaking credit-generating 
projects more viable.” PENNVEST, 
as an intermediary that is con-
tracted with both the buyer and the 
seller, also assumes default risk and 
enforcement responsibility in its 
contracts. As such, the PENNVEST 
clearinghouse not only reduces 
transaction costs but also greatly  
reduces risk exposure to both buyer 
and seller.
North Carolina’s Ecosystem 
Enhancement Program (EEP) offers 
an in-lieu fee system. Develop-
ers who are required to offset their 
nutrient loads from stormwater 
can opt for a “buy-down option” in 
which they pay an in-lieu fee to EEP. 
EEP, once it collects sufficient fees 
to create an economy of scale, issues 
a request for proposals for private 
sector turnkey mitigation projects. 
The North Carolina model reduces 
buyer uncertainty, as the buyers 
have a guaranteed option for meet-
ing their offset obligation at a known 
price. On the other hand, this model 
has been criticized for its potential 
to negatively impact market dynam-
ics. If in-lieu fees are low, they can 
interfere with the market’s setting 
of credit prices, driving prices down 
and hindering supply (Kelly 2013b).
The Ohio River Basin Water Qual-
ity Trading Project uses a revolving 
bank model. The bank is adminis-
tered by EPRI and operates through 
local soil and water conservation 
district offices. Private investment 
dollars are being used to fund con-
servation practices on local farms 
and generate credits. Those credits 
will then be sold to buyers in the 
watershed, and the proceeds used to 
fund additional offset projects. This 
model minimizes market uncertain-
ties for buyers and sellers. In addi-
tion, the revolving bank model serves 
a role similar to that of aggregator, 
reducing risks to the buyers because 
they are able to consolidate risk by 
purchasing from a single entity (the 
bank) instead of several (individual 
farmers).
Government Guarantee Program
Attracting private capital to the mar-
kets can be challenging, particularly 
in the early stages of water quality 
trading programs. Some have argued 
that the government could help play 
a more active role to stimulate water 
quality trading market demand and 
supply. One way to do this could be 
for the government to create a fed-
eral credit guarantee program that 
protects early actors by agreeing to 
purchase credits that go unsold. 
Senator Ben Cardin introduced 
legislation in 2009 that included a 
“Chesapeake Bay Nutrient Trading  
Guarantee Pilot Program” with  
Agricultural nonpoint sources may 
find a clearinghouse arrangement to 
be beneficial because, similarly to 
working with an aggregator, a credit 
bank would serve as the intermediary.
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the goals of encouraging innovative  
practices on agricultural land, 
accelerating restoration, leveraging 
public funds to provide capital to 
the private sector for accelerating 
restoration, and supporting Bay-wide 
nutrient trading. Although the bill 
was not passed, the pilot program 
would have included a $20 million 
guarantee fund to be available for 
the first five years of an interstate 
nutrient trading program, providing 
a federal guarantee for any unsold 
credits until the market matured 
(Chesapeake Clean Water and Eco-
system Restoration Act 2010).
The advantage of a credit guarantee  
program is that it establishes a 
known cost for risk mitigation. 
However, such a program has the 
potential to be abused because its 
safety net could serve as an incentive 
for individuals to implement projects 
that are not, in essence, good invest-
ments and may not have otherwise 
gone forward.
Iv. conclUSIon
Many mechanisms are available 
for mitigating risks that buyers and 
sellers perceive when evaluating 
whether to participate in a water 
quality trading market. It is impor-
tant to note that each mechanism  
for addressing uncertainty comes at  
a cost. For instance, using trading  
ratios will increase the cost of pro-
ducing a credit and may have an 
impact on supply. Mechanisms like 
verification, use of aggregators, and 
credit banks also increase trans- 
action costs in the market. It is 
important that program designers 
and administrators understand the 
types of uncertainty and risk that 
participants in their program are 
likely to face and implement solu-
tions that maintain environmental 
integrity and minimize transaction 
costs to participants. On the follow-
ing page, Table 1 summarizes the 
findings presented in this paper: the 
five main types of uncertainty, the 
available mechanisms for address-
ing them, the pros and cons of each 
mechanism, and an estimate of the 
level of cost that is typically involved.
When deciding which mechanisms 
to use, program designers should 
assess the forms of uncertainty that 
are present in a potential trading 
program. Next, they should identify 
all of the available mechanisms for 
addressing those forms of uncer-
tainty. Programs can employ these 
mechanisms in tandem or individu-
ally, depending on the program’s 
goals, needs, available resources, and 
other circumstances. The benefits 
and drawbacks of each option should 
be carefully considered along with 
region-specific factors such as avail-
able data, tools, and resources, and 
the presence of policies that may 
impact or guide the trading program.
In addition, more research and 
analysis on the various mechanisms, 
and the science and policies on which 
they’re based, should be conducted. 
To better quantify nonpoint source 
loads, and therefore reduce scientific 
and biophysical uncertainty, more 
research is needed on the hydrology 
of natural systems and the effects of 
BMPs, and modelers must continue 
to refine tools and models to reflect 
the best available science. Program 
designers must weigh the costs of the 
mechanisms to address behavioral, 
regulatory, and market uncertainty 
against the benefits provided. And 
finally, more research is needed on 
how to best combine these mecha-
nisms to ensure all aspects of uncer-
tainty are adequately addressed, 
without unnecessarily compromising 
the efficiency of a trading program. 
In the end, program designers 
should establish water quality  
trading programs that minimize 
uncertainty so that water quality 
goals can be achieved in a cost- 
effective manner.
It is important that program designers 
and administrators understand the 
types of uncertainty and risk that 
participants in their program are likely 
to face and implement solutions  
that maintain environmental integrity 
and minimize transaction costs  
to participants.
Addressing Risk and Uncertainty in Water Quality Trading Markets
ISSUE BRIEf  |  february 2014  |  23
type of 
Uncertainty Mitigating Mechanism pros cons cost
Scientific and 
Biophysical
Direct measurement    If conducted properly, may be 
most accurate credit estimation 
method
  Is labor intensive 
  Is technically challenging 
  Has attribution challenges
high
BMP effectiveness estimates    Can rely on available data
   Achieves consistency  
among trades
   Rely on averages, aren’t  
site specific
low*
Estimation tools and models   Can be site specific    Have their own degrees  
of uncertainty
varies*
Uncertainty ratio    Communicates easy-to-under-
stand margin of safety
   Can be adapted to specific 
BMPs or circumstances
   May be duplicative if other 
mechanisms in place
varies
Retirement ratio    Assures water quality is not 
compromised
   May be duplicative if other 
mechanisms in place
varies
extreme 
events
Centralized Credit Reserve   Pools risk    May be duplicative if other 
mechanisms in place
varies
Behavioral
Aggregators   Transfer liability and absorb risk
  Diversify credit sources
   Cause some costs to be lost  
to intermediary
low
Self-insurance    Can be adapted to specific 
BMPs or circumstances
   May be duplicative if other 
mechanisms in place 
   May not be as efficient as a 
pooled-risk insurance policy
varies
Verification    Provides easy-to-understand 
assurance for the public
  Is labor intensive low
Shared liability   Encourages shared financial risk    Encourages shared financial 
risk 
   Still attributes sole regulatory 
risk to buyer
N/A
tYpeS of UnceRtAIntY And MechAnISMS foR RedUcIng UnceRtAIntY RISkS
tA
Bl
e 
1
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type of 
Uncertainty Mitigating Mechanism pros cons cost
Regulatory
Grandfathering   Encourages early action 
  Provides market certainty
   Risks compromising  
water quality in light of new 
regulations or information
N/A
Certainty programs   Encourage early action 
  Provide market certainty
   Risks compromising  
water quality in light of new 
regulations or information
low
Water quality trading design 
standards and best practices
   Provide guidance and clear 
standards for program design
   May not deter litigation unless 
standards are endorsed by 
regulatory agencies
low
Market
Preimplementation 
certification
   Encourages project planning 
without upfront investments
   May increase buyers’ perceived 
risks
N/A
Credit banks    Provide more efficiencies than 
bilateral exchanges 
  Centralize risk
   Cause some costs to be lost to 
intermediary 
   Use of price-setting means can 
interfere with market dynamics 
   May stifle third-party actors 
who transact sales
low
Government guarantee    Provides assurance that credits 
generated will be sold 
   Relies on public funds to 
artificially stimulate market
high*
*Costs typically borne by government agencies or other program developers rather than market participant.
tYpeS of UnceRtAIntY And MechAnISMS foR RedUcIng UnceRtAIntY  
RISkS (contInUed)tA
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economic opportunity and human well-being. But 
today, we are depleting Earth’s resources at rates 
that are not sustainable, endangering economies 
and people’s lives. People depend on clean water, 
fertile land, healthy forests, and a stable climate. 
Livable cities and clean energy are essential for a 
sustainable planet. We must address these urgent, 
global challenges this decade.
 
our vision
We envision an equitable and prosperous 
planet driven by the wise management of natural 
resources. We aspire to create a world where the 
actions of government, business, and communi-
ties combine to eliminate poverty and sustain the 
natural environment for all people.
 
our Approach
COUNT IT
We start with data. We conduct independent  
research and draw on the latest technology to 
develop new insights and recommendations.  
Our rigorous analysis identifies risks, unveils  
opportunities, and informs smart strategies. We 
focus our efforts on influential and emerging 
economies where the future of sustainability will  
be determined.
 
CHANGE IT
We use our research to influence government 
policies, business strategies, and civil society 
action. We test projects with communities, 
companies, and government agencies to build 
a strong evidence base. Then, we work with 
partners to deliver change on the ground that al-
leviates poverty and strengthens society. We hold 
ourselves accountable to ensure our outcomes 
will be bold and enduring.
 
SCALE IT
We don’t think small. Once tested, we work 
with partners to adopt and expand our efforts 
regionally and globally. We engage with decision-
makers to carry out our ideas and elevate our 
impact. We measure success through government 
and business actions that improve people’s lives 
and sustain a healthy environment.
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